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Abstract 
 
Many argue that public school systems should stop linking teachers’ salaries so closely to their 
years of experience. However, the effect of deferred retirement compensation on the premium 
paid to experienced teachers has, to date, been underappreciated. To shed more light on this 
issue, we calculate the total compensation earned by teachers in New York City and Philadelphia 
from both salary and deferred retirement compensation under each system’s currently operating 
defined-benefit plan. Retirement compensation in both cities is backloaded, which substantially 
increases the premium paid to highly experienced teachers. In late-career years, teachers often 
earn a larger compensation premium from the accrual of pension benefits than from salary. We 
show that cash-balance retirement plans, which are less backloaded, would substantially reduce 
experience premiums without reducing the total compensation for the average entering teacher.  
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Introduction 
 The vast majority of public school teachers in the United States earn salaries according to 
a step-and-lane schedule that is a function of the number of years of experience and the number 
of advanced degrees they have attained. The single salary schedule persists despite a wide body 
of research demonstrating minimal relationship between teacher quality and experience after the 
first several years of employment.1  
Of course, from an economics and management perspective any compensation system 
that pays a premium to employees for attributes that are not systematically related to 
performance is problematic. Consequently, while there remains considerable disagreement about 
how to structure an appropriate remedy, several researchers and policymakers have pointed to 
this research to argue for decoupling the relationship between salaries and experience (see for 
instance Hanushek 2007; Podgursky and Springer 2007; Rice 2013; Winters 2011).  
 In this paper we demonstrate that these arguments in favor of altering the relationship 
between experience and compensation have thus far understated the issue. Today’s public school 
systems pay a much larger premium for experience than is currently appreciated in the academic 
literature or the broader policy conversation. 
 To date, researchers and other commenters have focused on the relationship between a 
teacher’s experience and her salary. What has gone unappreciated is the effect of deferred 
                                                          
1 Hanushek (1997, 2003) surveyed 206 estimates published prior to 2003 and found a consistent result of large 
returns to experience early in a teacher’s career that plateau after only about five to seven years in the classroom. 
Subsequent papers have continued to report similar patterns (Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2007; Rivkin, Hanushek 
and Kain 2005; Hanushek et al 2005; Gordon, Kane, and Staiger 2006). Some more recent estimates have identified 
substantial quality returns to experience gained in later-career years after accounting for sample selection (Harris 
and Sass 2011, Papay and Kraft 2015, and Wiswall 2013). However, even these recent papers do not dispute that 
the actual quality differences between more and less experienced teachers currently employed within schools 
plateau after the first several years in the classroom. 
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retirement compensation. The final-average-salary defined benefit pension plans (FAS DB) that 
cover the retirements of around 90 percent of today’s public school teachers very often heavily 
backload retirement compensation late into teachers’ careers.2 Consequently, the total 
compensation premium earned by experienced teachers relative to younger teachers is often far 
greater than is commonly understood.  
 In fact, the structure of the pension system can lead to heavily backloaded total 
compensation even in cases where teacher salaries are not backloaded. Roughly half of American 
public school districts have salary schedules that have steeper increases for early career years, 
while the other half have steeper salary increases in later career years (Grissom and Strunk 
2012). However, as we will show in this paper, in each of these cases the structure of the FAS 
DB retirement system results in large experience premiums that are often much bigger than the 
premiums earned as a result of the salary schedule. 
 Other research has illustrated the backloaded nature of teachers’ retirement plans 
(Costrell and Podgursky 2009), that teachers respond to the incentives imbedded in these systems 
(Costrell and McGee 2010, Ni and Podgursky 2016), and that these incentives do not appear to 
be linked to increased workforce quality (Koedel, Podgursky, and Shi 2013). However this 
literature has not yet adequately described how the combination of salary and deferred retirement 
compensation evolves across the span of a teacher’s career. 
We calculate the total compensation resulting from both salary and deferred retirement 
compensation earned by teachers for each year of experience for two large urban school districts 
                                                          
2 Defined benefit coverage taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) National Compensation Survey, March 
2015. See http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2015/ownership/govt/table02a.htm  
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-- New York City and Philadelphia.3 Though there is variation in both the generosity and the 
exact structure of teacher retirement benefits across systems, these district plans contain features 
that are commonly found in teacher retirement plans nationwide. We demonstrate that both of 
these pension plans backload retirement compensation in a way that substantially increases the 
premium earned by highly experienced public school teachers relative to younger teachers. In 
late-career years, teachers often earn a larger experience premium from pension benefits accrual 
than from salary.  
We then consider this experience premium under an alternative cash-balance (CB) 
defined benefit retirement plan in which teachers accrue pension benefits more evenly across 
their careers. We demonstrate that moving to a CB plan would substantially reduce the 
compensation premium tied to experience without reducing the total compensation that the 
average entering teacher can expect to earn throughout her career. 
 Our results contribute to the ongoing conversation about the disconnection between 
teacher compensation and performance in the classroom. Thus far, this conversation has not fully 
incorporated the role of retirement compensation, an important component of total compensation 
that is strongly related to experience. The primary contribution of this paper is to highlight the 
important role that deferred retirement compensation should play in these conversations, and to 
consider an alternative approach to the structure of current plans that would more evenly 
distribute compensation to teachers of different experience levels.  
Backloading under Current Teacher Pension Systems 
                                                          
3 Results for each of the ten largest U.S. school districts are presented in McGee and Winters (2015). 
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 The substantial majority of public school teachers in the United States earn retirement 
benefits under a FAS DB structure. In these systems, teachers earn a lifetime annuity that can 
only be accessed once they reach their plan’s retirement eligibility thresholds, generally a 
combination of age and years of service. The size of a teacher’s starting annuity increases as they 
accrue more years of service in the same system and as their salaries increase. The dollar value 
of an employee’s starting annual annuity for a given age at separation, as, and age at retirement, 
ar, is given by equation (1) below. Annuity payments are assumed to commence at the beginning 
of a period. 
 𝐵(𝑎𝑟|𝑎𝑠) = 𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟,𝑌𝑂𝑆 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑟,𝑌𝑂𝑆 ∗ (1 − 𝐸𝑎𝑟,𝑌𝑂𝑆) ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑎𝑠 (1) 
 In equation (1), B is the starting annual annuity beginning at age ar given age of 
separation, as, M is the benefit multiplier, R is an indicator for retirement eligibility, E is the 
percent reduction for early retirement, YOS is the number of years worked for the plan sponsor, 
and FAS is final average salary.4 
 The present value of a teacher’s retirement benefit, PVB, can be calculated at various 
ages of separation, as, using standard actuarial techniques.
5 For each as, the plan’s rules may 
allow the employee to begin receiving an annuity immediately or may require that she defer until 
meeting the retirement eligibility thresholds. The present value of the employee’s retirement 
benefit at any given age is given by equation (2) below. The equation calculates the maximum 
pension benefits an employee may achieve at each age, as.  
                                                          
4 For teachers’ salaries we use the master’s degree lane from the relevant district’s teacher salary schedule.  
5 The methods used here follow Costrell and Podgursky (2009), Costrell and Podgursky (2010). 
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 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑎𝑠 = max{𝑎𝑟∈𝐴|𝑎𝑟≥𝑎𝑠}
[𝐵(𝑎𝑟|𝑎𝑠) ∗ 𝐴𝐹𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝑓(𝑎𝑟|𝑎𝑠) ∗ (1 + 𝑟)
−(𝑎𝑟−𝑎𝑠)]  (2) 
 In equation (2), B(ar│as) is the starting annuity an teacher would begin receiving at age of 
ar given that the teacher separated at age as (see equation 1); AF is the annuity factor and 
represents the value of a dollar of annuity beginning at age of retirement ar; f(ar│as) is the 
conditional probability of survival from as to ar, and r is the interest rate used to discount future 
cash flows. 
 In principle, 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑎𝑠  represents the cash value of the annuity a teacher has earned at age 
as.
6 The teacher should be indifferent between receiving the lump sum 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑎𝑠  and the annuity 
B(ar│as). 
 The present value of a teacher’s retirement benefit can also be calculated net of employee 
contributions (i.e., isolating the portion of the benefit funded by the employer), PVBnet, shown in 
equation (3) below. TotCont represents cumulative employee contributions up to a specified 
age.7 While teachers will be interested in the total benefit provided under the plan from a 
retirement income perspective, netting out the value of employee contributions provides a 
measurement of the employer funded benefit or retirement compensation. Looking at benefits net 
of employee contributions allows us to better understand how retirement benefits fit into 
                                                          
6 For all present value calculations we use a nominal interest rate of 5 percent and an inflation rate of 2.5 percent. 
We use the mortality tables dictated for use under ERISA that are compiled and updated by the IRS. Specifically we 
use the 2013 static mortality table based on the RP-2000 Mortality Tables Report adjusted for mortality 
improvement using Projection Scale AA. The mortality table can be found at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-
08-85.pdf. 
7 Cumulative employee contributions were accumulated at the same nominal 5 percent interest rate used in 
present value calculations. 
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teachers’ total compensation package. The remainder of this paper uses PVBnet, or retirement 
compensation, as the primary variable of interest. 
  𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑎𝑠
𝑛𝑒𝑡 = 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑎𝑠 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑠 (3) 
 Under FAS DB systems, teachers generally earn the bulk of their retirement 
compensation very late in their careers. In these systems backloaded retirement compensation is 
the result of benefits that are based on teachers’ last few years of pay and requiring benefit 
deferral until retirement eligibility without wage or inflation indexing. The magnitude of the 
backloading varies substantially across plans, and is often quite considerable (McGee and 
Winters 2013). 
 The benefits earned under teachers’ retirement plans are the product of a complex 
combination of many factors, and as a result, it is both easier and more relevant to use real-world 
examples when presenting work on FAS DB benefits. We thus focus our analysis on two plans 
operating in major urban school systems that broadly illustrate the features found in many other 
plans nationwide: New York City and Philadelphia.8 
 New York City is an important plan to consider if only because it is the nation’s largest 
public school district. In addition, the city experiences less early-career teacher attrition than do 
most other urban school systems.9 One potential contributing factor to New York City’s lower 
than average early-career turnover is that its retirement benefits accrue more evenly across 
teachers’ careers (i.e., without as many jumps in value) and peaks later than is the case in many 
                                                          
8 The pension parameters and assumptions for each system were gathered from retirement plan documents 
including Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports, Actuarial Valuations, and benefits handbooks. A description of 
each pension plan’s parameters can be found in McGee and Winters (2013). 
9 A figure in the Appendix illustrates cohort survival rates in both New York City and Philadelphia. 
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other urban districts. Thus, our analysis of New York City’s plan illustrates a less extreme case 
than many other cities. That, as we will see, the plan is nonetheless heavily backloaded, helps to 
illustrate the severity of the issue this paper considers. 
 We also present an analysis of Philadelphia’s retirement plan. We choose Philadelphia 
because it has design features – sporadic spikes and drops in retirement wealth at certain career 
years – that are found in several other cities. Thus, Philadelphia serves to illustrate the 
implications of the highly uneven benefits accrual typical of FAS DB plans found in many other 
areas across the nation.10 
The solid lines in Figure 1 illustrate the net present value of retirement benefits in each 
year under Philadelphia’s and New York City’s current FAS DB systems for a 25-year-old 
teaching entrant. Though the specific values differ between the two systems, there are important 
similarities in the structure of these pension plans, which are broadly reflected in other school 
systems as well.  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 For both systems, we model the benefits tier currently in place for new hires. It is worth 
noting that in recent years several states have adopted changes to their benefit plans that affect 
new teachers but not previously hired teachers.11 These changes have generally resulted in less 
generous benefits that peak later in a teacher’s career, reducing the magnitude of the 
                                                          
10 See McGee and Winters 2013 for an analysis describing wealth accrual under the pension plans operating in the 
10 largest US school districts. 
11 See National Conference of State Legislatures’ (NCSL) Pension and retirement State Legislation Database 
(http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/pension-legislation-database.aspx) and National Council on Teacher 
Quality (NCTQ) report titled “No One Benefits” 
(http://www.nctq.org/dmsView/No_One_Benefits_Teacher_Pension_Systems_NCTQ_Report). 
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compensation premium paid through the retirement system. Thus, we argue that our results are 
quite conservative for the relationships under consideration. 
 The basic structure of pension benefits in Philadelphia and New York City is one of 
“peaks and valleys” (see Costrell and Podgursky 2009). In both cities, teachers do not vest in 
their retirement plan—and therefore do not earn any retirement compensation—until they have 
worked in the district for ten years. After ten years, teachers see gradual increases in their 
retirement compensation, and then at around 25 years of service, teachers rapidly accrue much 
more valuable retirement benefits. In New York City for example, a teacher earns an average of 
about $1,031 in retirement compensation during each of her first 15 years of service; while in 
each of the 15 ensuing years, she earns $16,908, on average. We refer to retirement plans that 
exhibit this pattern, whereby teachers earn relatively meager pension benefits through much of 
the early and middle portions of their careers and then much more valuable benefits late in their 
careers, as being backloaded. 
 In both Philadelphia and New York City, retirement benefits decline rapidly after forty 
years of service. At this point our example teacher is eligible to retire immediately, so each 
additional year spent in the classroom is a year she does not receive her retirement annuity. The 
value of her retirement benefits declines because her annual benefit is not increasing fast enough 
to offset this missed pension-year. 
Backloaded Retirement Compensation and the Premium Paid for Teaching Experience 
 An underappreciated consequence of backloaded retirement compensation is that it 
substantially increases the premium earned by higher experienced teachers. This section uses the 
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examples of New York City and Philadelphia to highlight the important contribution that 
retirement compensation makes to teacher experience premiums. The patterns found in these two 
districts are found in many other districts nationwide. In fact, benefits under New York City’s 
plan accrue somewhat more evenly and peak later than many of the retirement plans offered by 
peer districts, meaning that the reported results are actually quite conservative. 
 For the purposes of this paper, total compensation is the combination of salary and 
deferred retirement compensation. Teachers’ salaries derive directly from their school district’s 
salary schedule. For simplicity, we restrict our analyses to the salary schedule lane for teachers 
with Master’s degrees.12 The retirement compensation that a teacher earns in a given year is 
equal to the difference between the value of her benefits at the end of prior year and the end of 
the current year (i.e., year-over-year change in net present value). In all figures and analyses 
retirement benefit calculations are made for a female teacher who enters the school system at age 
25.  
 For each year of service, Figure 2 deconstructs the total compensation deriving from 
salary and retirement benefits earned by an example New York City public school teacher.13 The 
lighter grey area represents compensation in the form of salary according to the salary schedule. 
While the darker grey area represents the value of retirement compensation. The areas in the 
figure are cumulative, and so total compensation is represented as the sum of the two areas. For 
instance, in her 20th year of service our example New York City teacher earns a salary of 
                                                          
12 Benefit structures are similar for those without masters’ degrees, though the specific amounts will differ 
because of the lower salary for being on that rung on the salary ladder. 
13 Total compensation also includes health care benefits. However, health care benefits are the same for teachers 
at any year of service and thus do not affect the compensation premium that the teacher earns. 
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$95,202 (represented by the light grey area) and experiences a $16,892 increase in the value of 
her pension benefits (represented by the darker grey area), for total compensation of $112,094. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 Early in a New York City public school teacher’s career, annual compensation increases 
derive entirely from moving up the salary scale—teachers, as mentioned, do not vest into the 
pension plan for ten years and thereafter do not become eligible for meaningful retirement 
compensation until reaching that threshold. However, once a New York City teacher reaches her 
third decade of teaching, retirement compensation rises rapidly. After year 22, our example New 
York City teacher’s salary no longer increases because she has reached the top of the salary 
schedule. But at the same time, she has reached the steep portion of the retirement compensation 
curve (see Figure 1) and she begins to rapidly accrue retirement benefits. In these later years, 
annual deferred retirement compensation can grow quite large relative to salary. In her 36th year, 
our example New York City teacher earns $100,049 in salary and experience a $49,936 increase 
in the net present value of their retirement benefits. 
 Figure 3 shows that this general story holds true for teachers in Philadelphia, though 
some of the specifics are meaningfully different. Philadelphia public school teachers hit the 
maximum step on the salary schedule after only ten years of service. Our example 25-year-old 
entrant earns no retirement compensation until her 17th year in the classroom. Then suddenly she 
accrues much more valuable retirement benefits over a few particular years. For instance, she 
earns an additional $7,716 of deferred retirement compensation in her 24th year of employment 
and then $102,975 in her 25th year. The large spikes in retirement compensation in particular 
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years are not unique to Philadelphia, and are the result of age and service eligibility thresholds 
that, once reached, qualify teachers to retire earlier and/or with more generous benefits. 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
In a teacher’s early years, the experience premium she earns is almost entirely due to 
differences in take-home salary. Beginning in year 20 (New York City) and year 25 
(Philadelphia), deferred retirement benefits begin to make up a significant share of the 
experience premium. In later years, the portion of the experience premium deriving from 
retirement compensation often is larger than that deriving from salary. For instance, relative to a 
tenth-year teacher, a thirty-fifth year teacher earns about 27 percent higher wages in New York 
City and earns the same wage (a 0 percent premium) in Philadelphia. However, taking into 
account deferred retirement compensation, the differences in total compensation between those 
teachers is 79 percent in New York City and 162 percent in Philadelphia. Such large differences 
in compensation exist despite no substantial evidence of a significant difference in the average 
performance of teachers at these different experience levels.  
 Interestingly, Figure 3 shows that salary increases in Philadelphia are actually quite 
consistent with prior empirical estimates of teacher quality returns to experience. As previously 
described, prior literature suggests that there are quality returns to experience in the first five to 
ten years in the classroom. Similarly, Philadelphia teachers receive wage increases in each of 
their first ten years, and then max out on the district’s salary ladder. That the wage experience 
premium in Philadelphia is consistent with prior teacher quality research only further highlights 
the influence of retirement compensation on the experience compensation premium. That is, our 
analysis suggests that due to the structure of retirement compensation, total teacher 
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compensation in Philadelphia is still considerably backloaded, even though the structure of 
salaries is not.  
 The checkered area in the figures highlights the fact that the value of teachers’ retirement 
benefits actually declines after a certain point in their careers - after about 40 years in both New 
York City and Philadelphia. A teacher’s benefit loses value when she is eligible to retire 
immediately and the annual increase in her benefit is not enough to offset the amount she loses 
by continuing to work rather than collecting her annuity. Thus, one effect of the FAS DB 
structure is that teachers who remain in the classroom after the plan’s specified “normal” 
retirement age are in fact teaching for pennies on the dollar. As a consequence, highly 
experienced teachers have a clear incentive to leave the classroom (Costrell and Podgursky 
2009). Once they reach retirement eligibility, experienced teachers would generally do better 
financially to retire with their current employer and either not work at all or perhaps take another 
job. Prior research suggests that teachers respond to the financial incentive to leave when they 
reach retirement eligibility (see for instance Costrell and McGee 2010). 
An Alternative Retirement Plan – Cash Balance 
 We have thus far explained how the backloaded nature of FAS DB plans dramatically 
increases the teacher-experience premium. This section considers the teacher-experience 
premium under an alternative cash-balance (CB) pension plan of equivalent cost to taxpayers and 
expected value for entering teachers.  
 Though there are many potential alternative retirement plans, including Defined 
Contribution plans similar to a 401(k), we choose to illustrate the implications of moving to a CB 
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plan because it allows us to change how teachers earn benefits across their careers without 
changing other features of the plan. Like the current systems, a CB plan is a defined benefit 
system. It offers the same investment and longevity protections as does the current FAS DB 
plans, and the benefits are similarly paid as an annuity (i.e. lifetime monthly payment). The only 
difference between the FAS DB plans and the cost-equivalent CB plans considered in this paper 
is a redistribution of deferred retirement compensation within teachers’ careers. Thus, since it 
otherwise has the same features, the CB plan offers a unique way to consider the experience 
premium implications of altering the structure of teacher retirement compensation while 
maintaining the annuitized defined benefit structure of the current system. Though five states 
offer CB plans to some public workers, we are aware of none that offer this type of plan to 
teachers (Pew and LJAF 2014); however, CB plans have been considered by policymakers in 
several states and are likely to continue to be part of a broader reform discussion. 
 We compare retirement compensation under the FAS DB systems described previously 
with a cost equivalent cash balance systems that have a smooth accrual pattern across teachers’ 
careers. By smooth we mean that retirement compensation at each point in an employee’s career 
is a constant percentage of cumulative earnings.14 For each district we calculate the average 
expected benefit for an entering teacher under the current structure and use that value to 
determine the accrual rate for the cost equivalent cash balance system. In pension parlance, the 
employer contribution percentage in our cost equivalent cash balance system is equal to the 
employer normal cost of benefits calculated using the Entry Age Normal method.  
                                                          
14 In practice the cash balance plan we model is equivalent to a plan where cumulative retirement compensation is 
equal to the accumulated employer contributions and interest, in our case 5 percent.  
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 The employer contribution percentage is calculated by dividing the expected value of 
future retirement benefits at age of workforce entry by expected cumulative wages. The cash 
balance system modeled in this paper has employer contributions equal to the employer 
contribution percentage and annual guaranteed interest on those contributions is equal to the 
interest rate used to discount liabilities, 5 percent in our case. 
 Equation (4), the numerator of the employer contribution percentage formula, calculates 
the expected value of retirement benefits standing at entry age, ae, where g(as) represents the 
separation probability distribution for a given entry age.15 The summation extends to the last 
possible age at which an employee might separate from employment, az. 
  E𝑎𝑒[𝑃𝑉𝐵
𝑛𝑒𝑡] =  ∑ 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑎
𝑛𝑒𝑡(1 + 𝑟)−(𝑎−𝑎𝑒)𝑎𝑧𝑎=𝑎𝑒 ∗ 𝑔𝑎𝑒(𝑎)  (4) 
 Equation (5), the denominator of the employer contribution percentage formula, 
calculates the expected cumulative wages for a worker entering employment at age ae.  
  E𝑎𝑒[𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑒] =  ∑ 𝐶𝑊𝑎 ∗ (1 + 𝑟)
−(𝑎−𝑎𝑒)𝑎𝑧
𝑎=𝑎𝑒
∗ 𝑔𝑎𝑒(𝑎)  (5) 
 Equation (6) represents the employer contribution percentage, the constant percentage 
cumulative wages that results in a smooth accrual pattern that is cost equivalent to the current 
backloaded FAS DB accrual pattern given a particular separation probability distribution. 
                                                          
15 The separation probability function, g(), is estimated using the decrement tables reported by each plan in their 
plan documents  (e.g., actuarial valuations and comprehensive annual financial reports). Retirement plan actuaries 
are concerned with accurately predicting plan cost, and so these decrement tables represent separation hazard 
rates based on historical plan experience. 
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Equation (6) is simply the quotient of equation (4) and equation (5). It is important to note that 
the employer contribution percentage is specific to a particular entry age. 
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e
  (6) 
 The dashed lines in Figure 1 compare the present value of retirement benefits under the 
current FAS DB and respective cost-equivalent CB systems in New York City and Philadelphia. 
Unlike the current system where pension benefits are backloaded, under the CB systems teachers 
accrue benefits much more evenly across their careers. Consequently, under the CB system 
teachers earn more valuable pension benefits earlier in their career than they would under the 
current FAS DB system.  
However, teachers earn substantially less retirement compensation in late-career years 
where the value of benefits under the current FAS DB system peaks. That is because the CB 
system does not redistribute retirement compensation away from those teachers who exit the 
school system in the early or middle portions of their careers toward those teachers who remain 
employed there for the entirety of their careers. That is, the cost-equivalent FAS DB system can 
only provide more valuable benefits to teachers who remain under the same plan for a full career 
to the extent that it decreases the retirement compensation of teachers who exit the system 
earlier.  
Though beyond the scope of this paper, it is reasonable to suspect that such a substantial 
change in the distribution of retirement benefits across teachers’ careers would have implications 
beyond reducing the experience premium for both teachers and school systems. From a teacher’s 
perspective, changing to a CB system would mean substantially reducing the maximum value of 
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the retirement benefits she could potentially earn around her current plan’s retirement eligibility 
thresholds, but in exchange she would earn more valuable benefits earlier in her career thereby 
reducing the probability she leaves before earning a meaningful retirement benefit. McGee and 
Winters (2014) demonstrate that any rational risk-averse entering teacher would have a 
preference – often a very strong preference – for the more even distribution of retirement 
compensation presented by the CB plan relative to a respective FAS DB plan of equivalent 
value.  
School systems, on the other hand, might worry that changing to a CB system could 
result in problematic changes in teacher attrition. Separated from the issue of cost, school 
systems might prefer a retirement structure that, together with other elements of compensation, 
maximizes the quality of the teaching workforce. From that perspective, a potential benefit of the 
current FAS DB structure is that it gives mid-career teachers a strong incentive to remain within 
the system in order to acquire the large payouts in late-career years. The smoother design of the 
CB plan, however, would reduce the financial penalty mid-career teachers face if they leave the 
classroom, thus potentially increasing turnover and harming teacher quality when they are 
replaced with less experienced teachers.  
Podgursky and Ni (2016) measure changes in teacher attrition patterns related to changes 
in the distribution of retirement compensation. In a recent simulation, McGee and Winters 
(2016) apply those estimates and find that moving from a FAS DB to a cost-equivalent CB plan 
would be predicted to have only a slight impact on mid- and late-career teacher attrition. The 
simulation goes on to show that such a change would thus be expected to have little to no effect 
on teacher quality in the short or long run. This result is similar to the empirical findings of 
Koedel et al. (2013). 
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Compensation Premium Paid For Experience Under a Cost-Equivalent CB System 
 This section analyzes the premium paid for experience under a CB plan with the same 
expected value as the respective current plan. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the distribution of salary 
and retirement compensation in each year under a CB plan, similar to Figures 2 and 3. Unlike the 
variable and seemingly arbitrary pattern of retirement compensation under the respective FAS 
DB system, the figures show that under a CB system pension benefits contribute a relatively 
consistent amount to the total premium paid for experience. Retirement compensation increases 
with teacher’s salary, but exhibits little of the arbitrary peaks and valleys of the current system. 
 In each system the CB plan substantially reduces the premium paid for experience in the 
form of deferred retirement compensation relative to the respective current FAS DB plan. This 
occurs because the CB plan spreads a teacher’s retirement compensation more evenly across her 
career than does the existing FAS DB plan. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 In this paper we have used information from two illustrative school districts’ current 
salary schedules and pension plans to illustrate the distribution of total compensation across a 
teaching career. Our primary contribution is to demonstrate that deferred retirement 
compensation substantially increases the premium that public school systems pay for more 
experienced teachers. We suggest that this experience premium is much larger than has thus far 
been appreciated in policy discussions. We then consider a cost-equivalent alternative retirement 
benefit distribution that would substantially reduce the premium earned by more experienced 
teachers. 
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 Our results contribute to the ongoing conversation about the wisdom of using 
compensation systems that strongly link teacher pay to experience levels. Current FAS DB 
retirement systems backload compensation in a way that is not consistent with empirical 
estimates of the relative quality differences between more and less experienced teachers. Current 
retirement systems thus further exacerbate the already weak link between teacher effectiveness 
and compensation to an extent that has not yet been fully appreciated. 
 One way to decrease the premium paid for teaching experience is to adopt a retirement 
benefit structure by which teachers earn benefits more evenly across their careers. We 
demonstrate that adopting a cost-equivalent cash-balance plan would substantially reduce the 
premium paid to experienced teachers while continuing to offer teachers a meaningful, secure 
benefit within a defined benefit structure. Such a system would better align teacher compensation 
to teacher quality by increasing the amount that school systems compensate teachers in their first 
several years in the classroom when research suggests they are making their most substantial 
quality improvements. The plan we consider is cost-equivalent to the school system and offers 
teachers the same investment and longevity protections as their current pension plans. 
 Whether or not decreasing the premium paid to experienced teachers would have an 
impact on educational outcomes is an open question worthy of future research. McGee and 
Winters (2016) suggests that moving to a CB system would be expected to have little to no 
impact on teacher quality due to changes in teacher attrition behavior. Grissom and Strunk 
(2012) find higher educational outcomes in school systems with more compressed wage 
schedules, though it is not entirely clear whether this would also translate to more compressed 
deferred retirement compensation distributions. Future work evaluating the implications of 
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retirement benefits structure on teacher quality would add considerable value to this 
conversation.  
It is also worth considering retirement compensation from the teacher’s perspective. 
McGee and Winters (2014) show that any risk-averse entering teacher should have a strong 
preference for a cost-equivalent CB plan relative to a FAS DB plan because participating in a CB 
plan substantially increases the likelihood that they will earn a meaningful retirement benefit by 
the time they decide to leave the classroom. 
 Thus, at worst it appears that such a policy change would benefit entering teachers at no 
taxpayer cost and, as the results of this paper show, would better align teachers’ total 
compensation with real differences in quality over the course of teachers’ careers.  
  
20 
 
References 
 
Clotfelter, C., H. F. Ladd, and J. L. Vigdor (2007). How and why do teacher credentials matter 
for student achievement? NBER Working Paper 12828 
 
Costrell, R. M. and Podgursky, M. (2009). Peaks, Cliffs, and Valleys: The Peculiar Incentives of 
Teacher Retirement Systems and their Consequences for School Staffing. Education Finance 
and Policy, 4(2): 175-211. 
 
Gordon, R., Kane, T. J., & Staiger, D. O. (2006, April). Identifying effective teachers using 
performance on the job. (The Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper 2006-01). Washington, 
DC: The Brookings Institution. Retrieved January 25, 2008, from 
http://www3.brookings.edu/views/papers/200604hamilton_1.pdf 
 
Grissom, J. A. & K. O. Strunk (2012) How should school districts shape teacher salary 
schedules? Linking school performance to pay structure in traditional compensation schemes. 
Educational Policy, 26(5). 
 
Hanushek, E.A. (1997). “Assessing the effects of school resources on student performance: An 
update”. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 19 (2), 141–164. 
 
Hanushek, E.A. (2003). “The failure of input-based schooling policies”. Economic Journal 113 
(485), F64– 
F98. 
 
Hanushek, E. A. (2007). The single salary schedule and other issues of teacher pay. Peabody 
Journal of Education, 82(4): 574-586. 
 
Hanushek, E.A., Kain, J.F., O’Brien, D.M., Rivkin, S.G. (2005). “The market for teacher 
quality”. Working 
Paper 11154. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA (February). 
 
Harris, D. N. and Sass, T. R. (2011). Teacher training, teacher quality and student achievement. 
Journal of Public Economics, 95: 798-812. 
 
Koedel, C., Podgursky, M., and Shi, S. (2013). Teacher Pension Systems, the Composition of the 
Teaching Workforce, and Teacher Quality. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 32(3): 
574-596. 
 
McGee, J. and Winters, M. A. (2013). Better Pay, Fairer Pensions: Reforming Teacher 
Compensation. Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. 
 
McGee, J. and Winters, M. A. (2014). Better Pay, Fairer Pensions II: Modeling Preferences 
Between Defined-Benefit Teacher Compensation Plans. Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. 
 
21 
 
Papay, J. P. and Kraft, M.A. (forthcoming). Productivity returns to experience in the teacher 
labor market: Methodological challenges and new evidence on long-term career improvement. 
Journal of Public Economics,  
 
Pew Charitable Trusts and Laura and John Arnold Foundation (2014), Public Pension Cash 
Balance Plans: A Primer. 
 
Podgursky, M. J. and M. G. Springer (2007). Teacher performance pay: A review. Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management, 26(4): 909-949. 
 
Podgursky, M., and Ni, S. (2016). How Teachers Respond to Pension System Incentives: New 
Estimates and Policy Applications. Journal of Labor Economics, 34(4) : 1075-1104 
 
Rice, J. K. (2013). Learning from experience? Evidence on the impact and distribution of teacher 
experience and the implications for teacher policy. Education Finance and Policy, 8(3): 332-348. 
 
Rivkin, S.G., Hanushek, E.A., Kain, J.F. (2005). “Teachers, schools, and academic 
achievement”. Econometrica 73 (2), 417–458. 
 
Winters, M. A. (2011). “Measuring teacher effectiveness: Credentials unrelated to student 
achievement.” Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. Issue Brief No. 10. 
 
Wiswall, M. (2013). The dynamics of teacher quality. Journal of Public Economics, 100, 61-79. 
  
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
$0
$100,000
$200,000
$300,000
$400,000
$500,000
$600,000
$700,000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51
Figure 1
Value of Employer Sponsored Retirement 
Benefits
(Constant Dollars)
NYC FAS-DB Philadelphia FAS-DB NYC CB Philadelphia CB
23 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figure illustrates independent contribution of salary and present-value of dollars accrued in 
retirement compensation, during each year of service. The lighter portion represents salary. The 
darker portion represents the difference in present value of retirement wealth from previous year. 
The checkered area represents the portion where retirement wealth accrual is negative, and thus 
decreases total compensation.   
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Note: Figure illustrates independent contribution of salary and present-value of dollars accrued in 
retirement compensation, during each year of service. The darker portion represents salary. The 
lighter portion represents the difference in present value of retirement wealth from previous year. 
The checkered area represents the portion where retirement wealth accrual is negative, and thus 
decreases total compensation. 
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Note: Figure illustrates independent contribution of salary and present-value of dollars accrued in 
retirement compensation, during each year of service. The lighter portion represents salary. The 
darker portion represents the difference in present value of retirement wealth from previous year.   
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Note: Figure illustrates independent contribution of salary and present-value of dollars accrued in 
retirement compensation, during each year of service. The lighter portion represents salary. The 
darker portion represents the difference in present value of retirement wealth from previous year. 
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